This paper defines a type of constrained artificial neural network (ANN) that enables analytical certification arguments whilst retaining valuable performance characteristics. Previous work has defined a safety lifecycle for ANNs without detailing a specific neural model. Building on this previous work, the underpinning of the devised model is based upon an existing neuro-fuzzy system called the fuzzy self-organising map (FSOM). The FSOM is type of 'hybrid' ANN which allows behaviour to be described qualitatively and quantitatively using meaningful expressions. Safety of the FSOM is argued through adherence to safety requirements-derived from hazard analysis and expressed using safety constraints. The approach enables the construction of compelling (product-based) arguments for mitigation of potential failure modes associated with the FSOM. The constrained FSOM has been termed a 'safety critical artificial neural network' (SCANN). The SCANN can be used for non-linear function approximation and allows certified learning and generalisation for high criticality roles. A discussion of benefits for real-world applications is also presented. r
Introduction
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are typically known as non-linear distributive adaptive systems that have been inspired by biological processes in the brain. Neural networks are employed in a wide range of applications such as defence, medical and industrial process control domains [1] . A plethora of appealing features are associated with ANNs. One notable benefit includes the ability to learn and adapt to a changing environment. Another advantage is the ability to generalise outputs given novel data. The operational performance of ANNs can also exceed conventional methods [1] in areas of pattern recognition and function approximation. They are good tools for finding quick solutions using little input from designers. These qualities enable applications to provide improved efficiency through maximising performance in a changing operating context. However, the continued absence of analytical safety arguments necessary for certification has prevented their use in high criticality roles within safety critical applications.
There are several difficulties associated with ANNs that restrict their use to advisory roles (low criticality) in safety related applications. One prominent problem is the inability to understand and control the behaviour of the ANN since they are typically viewed as blackboxes. As a result, little or no arguments can be made about the control or mitigation of potential hazards. The main thrust of existing approaches justifying ANNs for safety critical systems have focussed on improving validation or performance. One example of such an approach [2] aims to provide guaranteed output within bounds. This approach interprets the ANN as a black-box and uses exhaustive testing to analyse the behaviour. This limits the benefits of ANNs which includes dealing with novel inputs. Although the concept of bounding the function is useful, it is not clear how the output bounds are derived from safety analysis. Other limitations include the ANN being prevented from learning post-certification. These restrictions highlight the need for improved neural models that allow white-box style analysis to understand and control behaviour. These qualities permit compelling safety and performance arguments to be made.
Our previous work [3] has identified a type of neural network model that has the potential for allowing white-box style (decompositional) analysis. It also focussed on other issues such as establishing a suitable development and safety lifecycle [3] (which employs extra tasks [3, 4] involved in developing ANNs). Building on this work, Section 2 lays out the definition of a suitable neuro-fuzzy model and its reasoning mechanism. This type of model combines the learning abilities of neural networks and knowledge expressed using fuzzy logic theory-an approach to computing based on ''degrees of truth'' as opposed to Boolean logic. Section 3 of this paper identifies safety concerns expressed as failure modes associated with function approximation. Section 4 argues the potential safety of the neural model by mitigating important failure modes though the use of safety constraints. These constraints contribute to product-based safety arguments for both ANNs and Fuzzy Logic Systems (FLS). Section 5 discusses learning algorithms associated with the derived model which are used during development and post-certification. Finally, Section 6 reaffirms the feasibility of the approach by illustrating the potential benefits in terms of performance and safety and how it potentially contributes to enhancing the 'efficiency' of real-world applications.
Further information about the foundations of neural networks and fuzzy logic theory can be found in [5, 6] .
Safety critical artificial neural networks
This section defines a new 'neuro-fuzzy' model called the safety critical artificial neural network (SCANN) which is based upon the fuzzy self-organising map (FSOM) [7] . The FSOM architecture and reasoning mechanisms have been derived from the well known Adaptive-Network-based Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) [8] . The FSOM model has the ability to fully express its behaviour using a set of fuzzy rules which encapsulate both qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the functional behaviour. Two variants of the FSOM have been developed, one of which is used for classification problems [7] , and the other for non-linear function approximation [9] . Results have shown that the FSOM performs well over a range of realworld system identification and control applications. These include system identification of a heating process [9] , control of the inverted pendulum [9] , fault diagnosis of a reactor [9] and several others. The FSOM has also been used for approximating the benchmark 'sinc' problem with results comparable to the ANFIS [8] system. Moreover, findings from pattern classification case studies show that the FSOM is markedly better (in terms of generalisation performance) than Kohonen's LVQ and Nearest Neighbour Networks [7] . Since the SCANN architecture, reasoning and learning algorithms are based upon well established approaches, the SCANN has good standing in terms of performance for non-linear problems.
The SCANN model exhibits a number of characteristics that are suitable for critical applications. These desirable firing strength for the ith rule a i * normalised firing strength for the ith rule a i, 1 output parameter for the ith rule that determines function derivative c i,j center of the fuzzy set for the ith rule and the jth input dimension f i output function for the ith rule f P weighted averaging function for defuzzification f l bounded linear function f S saturation function g a small positive number greater than zero g a learning rate for output parameters g Ur,j learning coefficient of the fuzzy set U r,j gd U constant used to decay or anneal the learning rate set m total number of rules mU i,j (x j ) membership function for fuzzy set U x,j and input x j max y i maximum output bound for the ith rule min y i minimum output bound for the ith rule max sr i,j minimum output bound for sr i,j min sl i,j minimum output bound for sl i,j , sr i,j n total number of input variables O i bounded output interval for the ith rule p(t) parameter state of the SCANN s w,k spread of the winner rule s r,k spread of the runner-up rule sl i,j left spread edge of the fuzzy set U i,j sr i,j right spread edge of the fuzzy set U i,j tp(t) temporary parameter state of the SCANN D i,j (x j ) triangular membership function U i,j fuzzy set for the ith rule and the jth input dimension w k default width of a new spread wl left edge of the default spread width wr right edge of the default spread width W i,k overlap window for overlapping rules i and k [wl i,k , wr i,k ] interval defined by left and right edge of the overlap window W i,k x j input from the jth input dimension y i output value of the ith rule y* final output of the SCANN/FSOM characteristics have been highlighted in previous work [3] and include the following:
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Ability to use human understandable rules to describe behaviour: Qualitative representations of knowledge are used to express the behaviour of the SCANN (such as ''IF antecedent X is /pre-conditionS THEN consequent Y is /post-conditionS''). This helps comprehend and analyse SCANN behaviour without solely relying on quantitative representations.
Ability to represent behaviour within the SCANN using highly structured methods: This is achieved by exploiting decompositional approaches [3] to insert and extract SCANN behaviour. This involves clear mappings from every neuron (processing elements or building blocks), interconnection (links between neurons) and parameter to an element within the knowledge base.
Ability to perform rule insertion and rule extraction using computationally efficient processes: Unlike typical neural networks and some 'hybrid' ANNs (combining symbolic expert systems and neural learning) [10] , rules can be efficiently inserted and extracted without compromising the 'fidelity' of the knowledge base [9] .
Ability to analyse and control the behaviour of the SCANN: As a result of comprehensibility and fidelity offered by the extracted rules from the SCANN, there is potential to control behaviour in order to address safety concerns.
Knowledge encapsulated through theoretical or empirical sources are represented in the FSOM as Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy rules [11] . These rules can be described as (1) <i : IFðx 1 is U i;1 AND; . . . ; AND x n U i;n Þ THEN
A fuzzy set is a generalisation of conventional set theory to represent vagueness in everyday life. Each fuzzy set in (1) is defined as U i,j for the ith rule where i ¼ 1,2,y,m, (m is the total number of rules) and the jth input where j ¼ 1,2,y,n (n is the total number of input variables). A full table of symbols used throughout this section can be found in Nomenclature. The fuzzy sets can be described linguistically using meaningful labels such as {LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH}. These labels can also be described quantitatively as discrete or continuous ranges. The rule output y i is computed using a linear function f i of the ith rule inputs. This function is defined later in this section. All rules in the FSOM have the same output and input variables.
If a rule has n41 inputs and a single output then it is defined as a multiple-input single-output (MISO) rule. Single input rules with one output variable are termed as single-input single-output (SISO). Further information about fuzzy logic theory can be found in [9] .
The SCANN topology consists of seven layers and is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Layer 1 is the input layer and propagates inputs (from the environment using sensors) to layer 2. No preprocessing occurs here and the number of neurons equals the number of input variables.
Layer 2 computes the fuzzy set membership for inputs (x 1 ,y,x n ) using the triangular function defined by (2) and illustrated in Fig. 2(a) . This layer consists of a neuron for every fuzzy set U i,j . The centre of U i,j is c i,j (element where set membership is one) and the left and right edges of U i,j are sl i,j and sr i,j .
; sl i;j px j pc i;j ;
x j Àsr i;j c i;j Àsr i;j ; c i;j px j psr i;j ;
0;
otherwise:
The purpose of the membership function is to determine the degree to which a particular input value x j belongs to a fuzzy set U i,j . Responses for neurons in layer 2 are membership degrees for each input and range from zero to one. As shown in Fig. 2 (a) the left and right edges of the fuzzy set spread are described by [sl i,j , sr i,j ] for U i,j . All inputs values that lie within the corresponding fuzzy set range (sl i,j ox j osr i,j ) have membership greater than zero. An input value that equals the centre c i,j of U i,j always has a ARTICLE IN PRESS Fig. 1 . Safety critical artificial neural network adapted from Ojala [9] . membership degree of one. The fuzzy set centre c i,j can adapt to lie anywhere within U i,j during learning. Moreover, the parameters that define the fuzzy set spread [sl i,j , sr i,j ] can also adapt through suitable learning algorithms. Neurons whose computations are constrained for safety are denoted by double rings in Fig. 1 for layers 2, 4, 6 and 7. These safety constraints are described in Section 4.
Layer 3 computes the firing strength a i for each rule in the SCANN using the minimum operator defined by (3) and illustrated in Fig. 2(b) . The firing strength a i is used to represent the influence of the rule output y i . This is useful for cases when there are multiple firing rules for an input vector and is described further in layer 7. For each fuzzy rule, the firing strength a i is greater than zero if and only if all inputs (x 1 ,y,x n ) for an input vector are members of (U i,1 ,y,U i,n ) (i.e. all rule pre-conditions must be true for a rule to fire). In the SCANN, all neurons in layer 2 (i.e. for corresponding rules) are connected to the minimum operator in layer 3. Processing elements or neurons in layer 3 do not comprise of parameters that can be adapted using learning algorithms.
Alternatively, the product operator can be employed which is commonly seen as a more practical approach for real-world applications [12] .
Layer 4 is composed of normalisation neurons defined by (5) . These neurons normalise firing strengths a i for each firing rule to produce an output response a I * . As before, this layer does not consist of parameters that can be tuned through learning.
Layer 5 computes the rule outputs y i as defined by (6) using input values (from layer 1). Tunable parameters (whose value can be adapted through learning) that define the rule output function are a i,0 ,y,a i,n . Each rule i will only produce an output y i if all rule inputs are members of the input fuzzy sets (pre-condition).
The output is a linear function for the ith rule and the number of rule output neurons is equal to the number of rules. The total number of tunable parameters in this layer for each rule are n+1 or m(n+1) for all rules. Functions defined by (6) can be used to model non-linear functions and is a common technique using fuzzy rules [13] .
Layer 6 is an additional layer that is not present within the FSOM architecture. This layer is composed of a set of neurons which saturate the rule outputs according to bounds defined by (7) . The inclusion of this layer is discussed in the following sections.
if f i ðx 1 ; :::; x n Þo min y i ; max y i ; if f i ðx 1 ; :::; x n Þ4 max y i ; f i ðx 1 ; :::; x n Þ; otherwise;
where min y i and max y i are output bound extremes for the ith rule. Layer 7 consists of two neurons whose purpose is to determine a single output value from several firing rules. One neuron uses weighted averaging as defined by (8) . Multiple rule firing can occur when rule preconditions overlap (overlap of all fuzzy sets for two or more rules). Multiple rule firing can be resolved by producing a weighted average using rule outputs (from layer 6) and firing strengths (from layer 3 or 4).
The other neuron in layer 7 is a bounded linear function and is defined and discussed in Section 4. The vertical bars denote that the output of a single neuron in this layer is used as the final output. 
where the weighted average output is y* for a given input vector x. For a single firing rule i, y* ¼ f S,I (y i ). All FSOM parameters that undergo adaptation and optimisation for the ith rule are defined as (9) and (10): These parameters are tuned by learning algorithms described in Section 5. Typical SCANN applications may include vector mapping systems which is useful for system identification or control problems. For example, the potential uses may involve system identification using a time invariant mapping of input vector x(k) to provide output y*(k)-a system whose output does not explicitly depend on time.
Identification of potential failure modes
A desirable starting point for using ANNs in safety critical applications is to examine non-linear function approximation problems. Typical SCANN applications may include discrete vector mapping systems such as system identification or control problems. There are numerous safety problems such as flight control systems that often involve function approximation. Existing examples of using the FSOM and TS fuzzy rules for safety-related non-linear function approximation problems can be found in [8, 9, 14] .
Enabling the SCANN for use in safety critical systems requires integrating mechanisms to prevent specific faults (which may lead to potential failures). In previous work [15] , the safety criteria were established as a number of high-level goals within a safety argument expressed in goal structuring notation (GSN). These goals were based upon encapsulating different failure modes associated with the behaviour of ANNs. The main claims of the safety criteria focussed on controlling the input-output relationship during generalisation and learning (including learning with unrepresentative training samples).
Previous work has highlighted that potential failure modes associated with ANNs are not well understood [16] . However, a set of failure modes have been identified for the SCANN that have been derived from hazard operability study (HAZOP) [17] guide words (which originates from the process-control theory domain). The guide words were applied to the SCANN input and output data value and 'rate'. The following identified failure modes are sufficient for many real-world applications and are summarised in Table 1 . 'Sufficiency' of the failure modes is difficult to prove for all applications. However, the main argument for 'sufficiency' of the failure modes is that they have been derived by applying the well established HAZOP process to the SCANN functional properties. Using this exploratory style analysis, HAZOP [17] guide words were applied to the SCANN output 'value' and 'rate' as described in Table 1 . Failure modes 1, 3 and 4 have been derived from guide words 'MORE, LESS and REVERSE' and failure mode 2 from the guideword 'NONE'. These guide words aim to provide prompting and stimulation but their use does not guarantee 'sufficiency' or success. The HAZOP table was applied to the SCANN output interconnection since this determines the 'action' of the SCANN. Since the FSOM approximates non-linear functions by a series of linear functions, the derived failure modes are caused by undesirable values (too high or too low) for all parameters that define each linear function. These parameters define the function derivative and intersection for each linear function.
Causes for all failure modes are related to faulty knowledge base or rule parameters. For a FMEA representation, local and system effects of each failure mode will be application-specific. Mitigation and control of potential hazards will be performed through constraints and bounds imposed upon the SCANN generalisation and learning capabilities.
The interpretations of HAZOP guide words are an important factor that influences the identification of the failure modes. These interpretations were based upon the input-output mappings of the SCANN and were thus time invariant (described later in this section). This led to the derivation of failure modes 5-8 which are caused by the function derivative of the SCANN. The majority of the guide word interpretations stem from conventional system safety. An elaboration of how the guide words in Table 1 were interpreted is presented below:
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Date value, 'MORE' & 'LESS': These guide words have been applied to the outputs and inputs of the SCANN function. The interpretation made is ''output data value magnitude is too high or too low for an input vector''.
Data value, 'NO': The 'NO' guide word was interpreted as ''no output signal'' or output omission. This interpretation for the SCANN specifically became ''no output data given an input vector''.
Data value, 'AS WELL AS':
This guide word has been interpreted as ''redundant data output (commission) produced by the SCANN''. This guide word is usually interpreted as redundant data sent in addition to the intended value. However, the SCANN has a clear mechanism of producing a single output when presented with an input that causes rule firing.
Data value, 'REVERSE': This guide word has been interpreted as a reverse in the polarity of the output data value (positive or negative output value). This is encapsulated by failure modes 1 & 2 which determine safe polarity of the output through MORE/LESS guide words. Several other guide words were excluded from the analysis in Table 1 . Reasons for this are described as follows:
'PART OF': This guide word is usually interpreted as ''incomplete data transmitted''. This is not an issue with the SCANN since a single crisp value is transmitted as the output. ''Incomplete data'' may also be interpreted as omission of output which has been already discussed.
'OTHER THAN': This guide word is typically interpreted as ''data is complete but incorrect''. For the SCANN, other guide words used in Table 1 can be used to determine 'incorrect' output such as MORE/LESS.
'BEFORE' & 'AFTER': These guide words are related to sequencing properties. The SCANN produces an output for every input that leads to rule firing. As a result of the manner in which signals are propagated throughout the SCANN, sequencing problems are not a major task.
'EARLY' & 'LATE': These are related to non-functional properties such as timing issues. Non-functional timing properties are not considered as a major task since conventional methods can be used to address such issues.
In Table 1 , there are two main attributes of the output variable that have been considered: 'value' and 'rate'. Other attributes such as 'response time' are not been included within the HAZOP table. The interpretation of this attribute may be that response time is longer or shorter than required. This interpretation may indeed be a concern for the SCANN because of its ability to grow in size (thereby potentially impacting response times). The final excluded attribute is termed ''repetition time''. A possible interpretation of this attribute is when the time between output updates is too high or too low. However, these issues are not viewed as a major problem since conventional techniques can be used to tackle these issues.
An alternative interpretation of the guide words for the attribute 'rate' as used in Table 1 is that the next output at time t+1 depends upon the output at time t. This requires short-term memory of past signals which are used to transform a sequence of samples into a point in the reconstruction space. If the function is time variant, a different set of potential hazardous failures may be identified. This is useful for temporal problems where the measurements from the world are not independent input samples but functions of time. Example architectures which rely upon the time domain include dynamic recurrent systems.
To address safety concerns for time variant problems, the output must be controlled according to the time domain rather than the inputs. For such problems, conventional approaches may be used to tackle safety concerns. For example, black box constraints could be express rise or fall time using output filters known as a rate limiter. The input into the rate limiter would be output (of the SCANN) and time. The limiter would then produce a final output which follows requirements imposed upon the output w.r.t. the time domain. The scope of this paper is limited to tackling safety concerns associated with SCANN input-output mappings for time invariant problems.
Safety constraints
To tackle the potential failure modes associated with the operation of the SCANN, the approach is to control the potential parameter states such that no relevant failure mode can arise. To achieve this, constraints are typically applied to each rule which explicitly describe bounds on the possible parameter states for (9) and (10). Unlike alternative approaches for typical ANNs [4] , the use of parameter constraints is more feasible. This is primarily because the SCANN not only provides a white-box view of its behaviour, but the comprehension offered by fuzzy rules can be exploited using meaningful analytical approaches. Without focussing exclusively on quantitative analysis, the qualitative approach provides a suitable representation to relate the actual behaviour with the application context.
In the following sections, a set of constraints are defined which focus on tackling systematic faults within the SCANN. There are two aspects for tackling each failure mode. The first is that appropriate mechanisms are defined which enable the control and mitigation of potential faults. Secondly, hazard identification is needed to identify potential hazards and exploit the safety constraints to determine constraints on hazardous behaviour (i.e. safety requirements). This enables an approach for identifying the parameter values that constitute a fault and prevent them occurring during generalisation by controlling the learning algorithms. Faults associated with SCANN behaviour are managed in the following way:
Fault identification: Through suitable safety processes (defined for the safety lifecycle for ANNs [3] ) safety constraints are defined to encapsulate desired safety requirements. Violations of any of these safety constraints will lead to a systematic fault. Identification of these safety constraints can be efficiently performed by searching for constraints that are violated by the SCANN parameter state.
Fault elimination: Identified faults (safety constraint violations) can be eliminated through re-training or manual assertion. The elimination of all identified faults will lead to a 'safe' SCANN state. This 'safe' SCANN state will be able to perform generalisation if the parameter state is constant. Once all constraints are defined and all faults removed the SCANN can then undergo the process of certification assuming fault prevention is tackled.
Fault prevention: To allow the SCANN to adapt and tune itself, constrained learning algorithms are employed to ensure that the defined constraints are not violated. This implies that the SCANN parameter state will only adapt if the desired changes do not result in the introduction of faults.
The approach considers tackling primary faults directly influenced by the SCANN. Secondary faults (such as sensor loss) can also lead to the failure modes and are associated with input vectors (for generalisation) i.e. if the input value is too high or too low. These secondary faults have to be tackled through other conventional means and are not within the scope of the SCANN operation.
Fuzzy rules for safety critical systems
Fuzzy logic attempts to model human reasoning using IF-THEN rules which is typically approximate and linguistic. This makes Fuzzy Logic an invaluable tool for expression and comprehension during design of the SCANN [3] . However, fuzzy sets have various interpretations that may or may not lend well to safety critical applications. There are two interpretations of fuzzy set membership which are known as likelihood [18] and random views [18] . The degree of membership is interpreted probabilistically (from possibility reasoning). These are undesirable for critical applications [19] as satisfaction of rule pre-conditions can potentially lead to hazardous post-conditions (during ANN mappings). This is because it is not said with certainty whether an input belongs to a fuzzy set or not. This type of argument is essential for providing assurance about the pre-conditions and postconditions of the behaviour.
Other interpretations are measurement [18] and similarity views [18] . These are more appropriate, as set membership for an input (that is precise and non-approximate) can be determined with certainty. The degree of membership is seen as relative to other members within the set. This relationship is discovered through training samples and expressed using triangular, Gaussian, trapezoid or other functions [9] .
On the whole, soft-computing is described as a combination of ANNs, fuzzy logic systems (FLS) and probabilistic reasoning. Our area of interest is the combination of ANNs and FLS primarily because of the benefits offered by 'hybrid' systems [3] whilst avoiding probabilistic safety arguments.
To justify the safety of the SCANN for SISO rules, the following sections present product-based arguments (extracted from a safety case pattern) about various functional properties.
Safety argument for function mappings using semantic constraints
Failure modes 1 and 2 are when the output is too high or too low for the current input. This may be caused by flawed training samples resulting in the SCANN diverging from the desired function. Remedial actions for this failure mode include incorporating semantic bounds for each rule. These bounds are used to control the input set parameters (9) and output functions parameters (10) during learning (rule pre and post-conditions).
There are two main branches of argument supporting the claim that the SCANN adheres to its bounds. The first is associated with providing assurance that all rule inputs with membership greater than zero lie within prescribed bounds. These bounds are derived from hazard analysis and system safety requirements as discussed in [3] .
To provide assurance that failure modes 1 and 2 will not occur (during learning post-certification) the parameters for input sets (9) for every neuron (in layer 2) are bounded according to (11) and (12). These bounds limit the possible meanings of the input fuzzy sets and are derived through safety analyses [20, 21] .
Bounded Left Spread sl i;j 2 ½min sl i;j ; c i;j ,
Bounded Right Spread sr i;j 2 ½c i;j ; max sr i;j .
Moreover, the centre of the input fuzzy set is constrained to lie within the set spread as defined by (13) . This is to prevent the centre stepping outside spread edges leading to false satisfaction of rules pre-conditions. Bounded Core c i;j 2 ½sl i;j ; sr i;j .
The relationship of safety constraints (11), (12) and (13) for each input fuzzy set is defined by (14) . max sl i;j psl i;j pc i;j psr i;j p max sr i;j .
Attempts to violate these bounds may be due to unrepresentative or flawed training samples. Offending training samples are consequently rejected (or used again when the learning rates become smaller).
Having defined input bounds, the next argument is the adherence of set bounds during generalisation. One potential failure is that the output function may attempt to produce a value that is beyond bounds placed upon rule outputs defined by [min y i , max y i ] (illustrated in Fig. 3 ). The saturation function described by (7) is used to enforce the rule output constraints in layer 6.
Acquiring such bounds from safety requirements is simplified because of the comprehensibility offered by fuzzy rules. When attempting to define a bound, output extremes may not be common for the entire rule input range. In this case, the approach is to split the rule so that the output bounds for each rule are uniform. This is one of the tasks performed during the development and safety lifecycle processes [3, 21] . To enforce constraints for multiple firing rules, the weighted average (8) will always output a value within the defined output bounds (of at least one firing rule). This will occur as long as rules with arbitrary overlap in all inputs sets also overlap in output ranges defined by [min y i , max y i ].
To understand how semantic bounds for the SCANN are derived consider the following rule (15):
During development phases, LOW may be defined as the discrete range {0,y,40}. The definition of LOW is a precondition of the rule to fire. Using this input range, safe limits for the rule output are acquired from safety requirements (which are associated with control laws of the controlled device). The rule post-condition becomes [min y i , max y i ] and expresses non-changing output extremes. The input set used to derive output bounds then becomes a safety bound. During learning, the semantics of LOW is constrained to lie within bounds according to (14) .
Safety argument for input space coverage
Additional constraints are needed to tackle failure modes 3 and 4. These failure modes can be described as undesirable output omission or commission for some input vector. Conditions of omission and commission of the SCANN output can lead to hazardous 'inaction' or 'action' and an example of these failure modes is shown in Fig. 4 .
Failure mode 3 occurs when there is no output given valid inputs (output omission). In Fig. 4 , failure mode 3 occurs for inputs between rules 2 and 3. This input range or 'gap' is not covered by all rules consequently leading to an absence of a suitable output mapping. Failure mode 4 occurs for rule 1 where the SCANN maps outputs for inputs that are outside a defined input range (for each input dimension). To address failure modes 3 and 4 the desired input space coverage needs to be obtained from safety requirements using analytical phases during hazard analysis [3, 21] .
There are two well-known existing alternatives for ensuring that the entire input space is covered:
1. Use a default rule [9] : This is defined as a single rule that encapsulates the entire input space and consists of a constant output function. An example default rule is defined by (16) where the rule antecedents are defined to encapsulate the corresponding input universe of discourse-(discrete or continuous (ordered or ARTICLE IN PRESS Fig. 3 . Semantic safety bounds derived from safety requirements for SISO rules. Fig. 4 . Example of failure modes 3 and 4 due to insufficient or superfluous coverage.
non-ordered) objects). The default rule defines a mapping for all preconditions and does not exploit the divide and conquer method offered by the fuzzy rules. Therefore, types of safety requirements (such as those related to semantic constraints) will not be uniform over the default rule. As a result, use of the default rule can potentially lead to additional difficulties for controlling behaviour. Moreover, default rules are highly limited as they are not tuned and are typically removed after self-generation (during design). For these reasons, the default rule is an unsuitable candidate because of the difficulties associated with adhering to safety requirements.
The same argument applies to the Gaussian membership functions which also encapsulate the entire input space. The triangular membership function defined by neurons in layer two of the SCANN offers a clear definition of set members for a finite interval of the universe of discourse.
Failures described as output omission are primarily as a result of faults associated with an incomplete knowledge base or a faulty input set quantification. Such faults can arise by flawed assertion of rules or flawed adaptation of the input set spread parameters. Learning algorithms and unsuitable training data may lead to 'gaps' for the input space coverage. To tackle this problem, safety constraints are defined upon the rules in the SCANN to prevent failure mode 3 (for post-certification generalisation) and fulfil the property defined by (17) . For each input dimension, safety constraints defined as (18) and (19) are required.
8 sl i;j ;i¼1;...;m 9 k¼1;...;m Á iak, sl i;j 2 U k;j , sl i;j a min x j ,
9 ðp¼1;...;mÞ;ðq¼1;...;mÞ Á sl p;j ¼ min x j ; sr q;j ¼ max x j .
The input space that must be covered (at all times) is defined through analytical phases during hazard analysis (outlined in [3, 21] ). Property (17) asserts that for any input value x in the range of valid input values of X (universe of discourse), the input must be a member of at least one fuzzy set i. This property can be enforced by ensuring that after each antecedent parameter adaptation, there is overlap between rules according to (18) . Safety constraint (18) enforces the left spread of each fuzzy set to lie within another set which defines an overlap region. It is not necessary to assert the same for the right spread sr i,j since it is greater than sl i,j . This means that sr i,j would also have to overlap to satisfy (18) . Additionally, for two overlapping rules i and k, their activated fuzzy sets (for each input dimension) must have an overlap window that includes elements more than their set edges. An example of the condition prevented by constraint (18) is illustrated in Fig. 5 .
As described in Fig. 5 , overlap rules whose input fuzzy sets only overlap with the spread edge lead to no rule firing or output omission since membership of fuzzy set edges are zero.
According to safety constraint (19) , fuzzy set edges must lie upon the extremes of the input space. This constraint ensures that the input dimension is completely covered by the fuzzy sets. However, spread edges that lie upon the maximum or minimum input range extremes are not members of the fuzzy sets (by definition of the triangular function (2)). In addition, these edges are not overlapped by other fuzzy sets. To overcome this pitfall, a small positive perturbation is added for membership of these inputs and is defined as follows (20):
where g is a small positive number greater than zero. MISO rules cause additional problems for maintaining input space coverage. To provide a similar argument for MISO rules, the constraints must take into account the multi-dimensional nature of the mapping. This requires that there must be a rule in the knowledge base for every combination of fuzzy sets between input dimensions (i.e. every possible combination of rule antecedents). This approach enables encapsulation of all input vectors (defined by the ranges associated with each input dimension).
Inevitably, this leads to the number of rules increasing exponentially with increasing input dimension and is a well ARTICLE IN PRESS known consequence of the 'curse of dimensionality'. The upshot of this is that more rules will need to be analysed (for growing problem size). Fortunately, many problems consist of single input dimensions requiring few rules.
Various faults may be introduced into the knowledge base which can lead to failure mode 4 (concerned with output commission). Output commission can occur if the knowledge base encapsulates parts of the input space that are not covered by the safety requirements (determined through hazard analysis in [3, 21] ). This can lead to rules with unsafe preconditions resulting in undesired rule firing.
Suppose
Constraint (21) states that for all spread edges that belong to each fuzzy set (for all rules), the spread always lies within the defined limits min x j and max x j for the jth input dimension.
As one branch of the safety argument, assurance needs to be provided that the safety constraints for input space coverage are not violated. Assurance for satisfaction of the safety requirements is provided through preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA) which evaluates input space coverage by examining rule input set parameters [21] .
The second branch of the safety argument is concerned with input space coverage during learning. The solution to this problem is to use a 'look ahead' method to determine whether any constraint will be violated as a result of any parameter adaptation. This is performed by the constrained static learning algorithm presented in Section 5.
Safety argument for function derivative sign
Failure modes 5-8 are concerned with output changes relative to input changes (i.e. the SCANN function derivative). The following safety constraints are defined to address failure modes 5 and 6 for SISO systems.
Failure modes 5 and 6 are caused by inappropriate function derivative signs (positive or negative). For a given application, the following functional safety requirements may be needed to tackle system level hazards: 
The purpose of (22) and (23) is to qualitatively express constraints on the SCANN function. Safety requirement (22) states that for an increase in input x, the output y decreases in magnitude. This safety requirement may be defined over the entire function (if linear) or over parts of the function (features of the non-linear function). Given that (22) imposes requirements upon the derivative of the function, it also implies the converse that if x decreases then y increases. Similarly, safety requirement (23) implies that if x decreases then y must also decrease. Since the requirement is imposed upon changes in the input magnitude, the output is constant if the input is constant (the output is not determined by time but inputs-for time invariant functions). If it is required that the output is constant for changes in input then this is addressed by safety constraints used to mitigate failure modes 7 and 8.
Constraints to mitigate failure modes 5 and 6 require that semantic and coverage constraints are defined and used (failure modes 1-4). These constraints ensure the continuity of the approximated function and are crucial for addressing failure modes 5 and 6 for multiple rule firing. For single firing rule cases, safety constraints defined as (24) are required (where (22) and (23) 
where t is used to signify state of the output parameter (for rule i) at a point in time. The safety argument for adhering to these bounds focuses upon providing assurance that the derivative sign (rule function gradient) as expressed by (24) is limited during generalisation and learning. The solution to this argument is that parameter a i,1 will always be positive to reflect increasing output (and negative to define decreasing output). In addition, the gradient in any case can be zero as a result of the saturation performed by the rule output bounds. Fuzzy rules provide an ideal representation to define the desired constraints. This is because they segment the approximated function leading to decomposition of the desired non-linear function. However, providing assurance that constraints within overlap regions (as a result of fuzzy sets) are not violated is an additional challenge. For rule overlaps of arbitrary size, there may overlapping rules with dissimilar gradient constraints. The interpretation of this condition is that bounds (22) or (23) no longer applies during the overlap because two separate safety requirements have been defined for the region. This is a realistic consequence of defining safety constraints for each rule and simply represents the region for the change in safety requirement.
Fuzzy rules provide an ideal representation to define the desired constraints. This is because they segment the approximated function and related to parts of the desired non-linear function (through decomposition). However, providing assurance that constraints within overlap regions (as a result of fuzzy sets) are not violated is an additional challenge. Overlap windows (of arbitrary size) may give rise to overlapping rules with dissimilar gradient constraints (i.e. one rule that has (22) and another that has (23)). An interpretation of this condition is that bounds (22) or (23) no longer apply during the overlap region because two separate safety requirements have been defined. This is a realistic consequence of defining safety constraints which simply represents a region for the change in safety requirement (to represent certain features such as peaks where the derivative sign changes).
Another case is when two or more overlapping rules have the same gradient sign requirements (22) or (23) . This may lead to the SCANN output (8) potentially violating safety requirements (22) or (23) at the boundaries of overlap regions. An example of this violation is illustrated in Fig. 6 which shows that the relative positions of each rule output at spread edges can cause failure modes 5 or 6 (when control is passed between rules).
Consider two neighbouring fuzzy rules i and i+1 where each spread edge for U i (except those that lies on the boundaries) is overlapped with another other fuzzy set. For example, U i+1 overlaps with sr i according to (18) where sr i+1 4sr i . An overlap window can be defined as W i,i+1 where i and i+1 are the indexes of two overlapping fuzzy sets. The range of the overlap window W i,i+1 is defined by the interval [wl i,i+1 , wr i,i+1 ] where wl i,i+1 ¼ sl i+1 and wr i,i+1 ¼ sr i (as shown in Fig. 7) .
To avoid violating (22) or (23) 
This constraint is enforced at each spread edge that overlaps with another fuzzy set which is also constrained by (24) . An example of constraint (25) is illustrated in Fig. 8 . In this diagram, rules 1 and 2 illustrates upper part of constraint (25) and rules 3 and 4 illustrates lower part of (25).
Although outputs at window edges follow the desired safety requirements, the derivative of the weighted averaging may cause failure modes 5 and 6. This is because the activations are not constant (which act as weights upon the outputs) and may not allow a strictly increasing or decreasing output change.
To address the 'defuzzification' problem, an alternative method has been derived to guarantee that the function output during the overlap region follows safety requirements. This method is employed only for overlap windows whose rules have the identical safety requirements (either (22) or (23)).
The function y* starting from f S,i at the left side of overlap window wl i,i+1 to f S,i+1 at right side of overlap window wr i,i+1 ) must abide by defined constraints. To adhere to requirements for multiple firing rules, a linear function defined by (26) is used in place of the weighted averaging. Although the linearity of this approach may impact approximation ability, adherence to the safety requirement can be easily guaranteed. As a trade-off, set centres now have little meaning during 'defuzzification' but ARTICLE IN PRESS 
Safety constraint (25) is used with (26) to force the derivative f 0 l to abide by (22) or (23) . An illustration of this alternative 'defuzzification' method is presented in Fig. 9 .
The linear 'defuzzification' approach relies upon overlap windows composed of only two rules. To achieve this, each spread edge can only have one overlapping fuzzy set (except edges on input extremes which have none). This additional safety constraint is defined by (27) and applies to every set edge except those that equal min x or max x. By restricting the maximum number of overlapping rules at each edge (and safety constraint (28)), this also ensures that all rules have a non-overlap region which is a vital property to determine (26).
As a result of (27), use of the constrained dynamic learning algorithm will not lead to additional rules. The primary reason for this is that the dynamic learning algorithm will need to be extensively altered to provide assurance that new rules do not violate the rule overlap constraint (27).
Failure modes 5 and 6 can also be caused by subsumed rules. A subsumed rule is one whose input precondition is a subset of the precondition of another rule in the knowledge base. This condition can potentially violate the safety constraints as illustrated in Fig. 10 .
In Fig. 10 , R2 is subsumed by R1 which both have the same output constraints. The right edge of R2 can potentially result in output decrease as control is passed back to R1. A corrective measure could be devised to ensure that the output of R2 is less than R1 at its right edge and that the output of R1 is equal to the output of R2 at the left edge (of R2). However, this will require extra checks when updating R2 output parameters and can potentially over-constrain the learning ability. Moreover, the function within the overlap region will be R1 because of function defined by (26). Alternatively, the approach is to remove such subsumed rules (before certification) and make sure condition (28) is enforced during learning. 
This safety constraint means that for any two overlapping fuzzy sets i and p, p is not a subset of i.
Safety processes during the lifecycle identify violations of (24)- (28) prior to certification. Determining whether the actual parameter state of the SCANN abides by the safety constraints can be achieved by rule extraction. Similar to previous constraints, attempted violations during learning (post-certification) must be identified and rejected (as described later in detail in Section 5).
Safety argument for function derivative magnitude
Failure modes 7 and 8 are concerned with hazardous failures arising from the absolute value of the SCANN function derivative. More specifically, failure modes 7 and 8 describe conditions when the difference between outputs is too large or too small for a change in inputs. These failure modes may be of concern in system identification or control problems where sudden or slow output changes can be potentially hazardous. Fig. 9 . Example of a linear function used instead of weighted averaging during rule overlaps. Safety requirements (29) and (31) define allowable absolute function derivatives that may be specified for certain regions of the input space:
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where x 1 and x 2 are points defining the region for which the constraint applies. An example of a hazardous function (that exhibits failure mode 7) is illustrated in Fig. 11 . In this diagram, the derivative of R1 is ''too high'' resulting in excessively large output changes. In addition, an example of failure mode 8 is also presented in Fig. 11 where the derivative of R2 is ''too low''. To address failure mode 7 for single firing rules, safety constraint (33) must be enforced upon the rule output parameters.
ðÀ max a i;1 pa i;1 p þ max a i;1 Þ; if no sign constraint;
if output must be increasing;
ðÀ max a i;1 pa i;1 p0Þ; if output must be decreasing:
To simultaneously address failure mode 8, the safety constraint (33) becomes (34). Both (33) and (34) also make provision for constraints to address failure modes 5 and 6. 
Constraints (29) and (31) can also be used to define an additional safety requirement (35) which also falls within definitions of failure modes 7 and 8:
This can be achieved by defining safety requirements max a i,1 ¼ min a i,1 ¼ 0. If the derivative must not be constant and failure modes 5 and 6 are of concern, then (33) becomes (36): ð0oa i;1 p þ max a i;1 Þ; if output must be increasing; ðÀ max a i;1 pa i;1 o0Þ; if output must be decreasing:
These derivative constraints can be defined globally (i.e. constant for the entire function and applied to all rules) or locally (i.e. specific to particular rules). An additional constraint is needed to provide assurance that requirement (31) is met. To elaborate, if output saturation is used then the output derivative may be constant which violates constraint (34). An example of a condition prevented by this constraint is shown in Fig. 12 . This can be tackled by preventing output saturation caused by (7) through constraint (37) which is applied to every rule i that is bounded by (31). Safety constraint (37) is necessary to ensure that the output function for the constrained rule i must be within output bounds at each spread edge (as illustrated by R1 in Fig. 12 ). Constraint (37) also removes dependence upon the output saturation defined by the semantic constraints.
Because of the non-linearity of the weighted averaging, providing assurance that the safety requirements are adhered to during multiple rule firing is a more demanding task. The problems of concern include when the SCANN function enters and exits an overlap region (at each edge of the overlap window). In addition, the SCANN function within an overlap window must not violate the safety requirements and examples of these conditions are ARTICLE IN PRESS Fig. 11 . Example of failure modes 7 and 8. Fig. 12 . Rule output saturation leading to violation of constraint (31).
presented in Fig. 13 . These three conditions are the main areas of concern since they potentially produce a change of the SCANN function derivative.
To enable rule overlaps, constraints to address failure modes 1 to 4 are required. For two overlapping rules i and i+1 with different safety requirements, the maximum and minimum allowable derivatives become (38) and (39). Using the minimum and maximum safety requirement for the overlapping rules allows greater flexibility for learning.
min dy
In addition, safety constraint (26) is needed to linearise the function within the rule overlaps. This approach enables simpler control over the function derivative and helps provides assurance that hazardous failures do not occur within overlap regions.
The ability of f l to abide by the safety requirement depends upon the overlap window width and the rule outputs at the overlap edges. The overlap width defined by wl i,i+1 and wr i,i+1 is limited to ensure the function within the overlap adheres to (38), (39) and (40).
To provide assurance that the safety requirements are adhered to during the 'entry' or 'exit' into, or out of, an overlap region, constraint (27) must be applied which limits each spread edge to have at most one overlapping rule. This condition enables f l to be derived based upon an output of a single rule at each overlap window edge. Furthermore, constraints to prevent fuzzy set subsets are also required. This prevents output fluctuations (violating derivative requirements) for the condition described in Fig. 10 .
Constrained learning algorithms
By complying with derived safety constraints the SCANN has the ability to generalise without leading to corresponding failure modes. A further area of concern is related to learning algorithms which through parameter modification, may lead to violation of safety constraints (and safety requirements). These adaptable parameters are located in layer 2 (defining set membership for rule premises) and in layer 5 (linear functions of the inputs for rule consequences). The static learning algorithm has the ability to perform online parameter adaptations (after each training sample) in a supervised or unsupervised fashion. However, adapting parameters presents the risk of violating the defined safety requirements expressed as safety constraints. To allow learning capabilities of the SCANN without the need for re-certification, the approach taken within this paper is to constrain the learning algorithms (to bound potential parameter states) such that none of the identified failure modes occur. The following sections describe constrained versions of both the static (parameter estimation) and dynamic (self-generating) learning algorithms.
Static learning algorithm
The static learning algorithm tunes parameters (9) and (10) using training samples or input data to improve generalisation performance. This algorithm does not insert new rules but refines and adapts existing ones. Consequently, this algorithm is termed 'static' to reflect how the knowledge base is changed. It is performed in two phases as defined in [9] : Phase 1: Antecedent parameters are frozen and the consequent parameters (10) are refined using the gradient descent algorithm [5] (supervised mode).
Phase 2: Consequent parameters are frozen and the antecedent parameters (9) are tuned using the modified LVQ algorithm [9] (supervised or unsupervised mode).
Phase 1 is performed using the well known Least Mean Square (LMS) algorithm [5]:
1. Propagate training sample with input signal vector x(t) at time t. 2. Determine learning coefficient g a (t) where 14g a (t)X0 defined for consequent parameters.
This determines the magnitude of the parameter changes and gradually decreases during training resulting in finer parameter adjustments. 3. Determine error between final output y* and desired output y.
Where the desired output is defined by the training sample. 
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The learning rate is g a (t) and is decreasing such that 14g a (t)X0 is true.
Phase 2 of learning is triggered when there are multiple firing rules for a given input vector. The first task involves choosing the input fuzzy set of the first runner-up rule (second most highly activated rule) r. This is done by selecting the rule with the smallest overlap (with the winner rule w where a w is the largest) and whose fuzzy set centre is furthest away as defined by (43) and (44).
win j ¼ minfsr w;j ; sr r;j g À maxfsl w;j ; sl r;j g c w;j À c r;j .
where win j is the relative width of the window and win k has smallest relative width. The runner-up spread is defined as s r,k or the edge sl r,k , sr r,k which overlaps with the winner rule (where k is corresponding input variable). After the appropriate spread has been chosen, it is updated and refined using the modified LVQ 2.1 algorithm. This learning law (45) helps the FSOM output y* converge onto the training data output y by increasing or decreasing the influence of the runner-up rule. The operation of the learning law (45) is described as follows:
The influence of the runner-up rule is increased by moving runner-up spread edge towards the centre of the winner rule.
The influence of the runner-up rule is decreased by moving runner-up spread edge away from the winner rule centre and towards s w,k .
where the learning coefficient of the fuzzy set U r,j is defined as g Ur,j . If a single rule fires then the learning algorithm initiates unsupervised learning. This process tunes the centres of input sets by moving the winner centre c w (firing rule) towards the input sample (using defined learning rate). Further details on the static learning algorithm for the FSOM can be found in [9] .
Static learning algorithms focus on adapting the semantic meanings of the knowledge (expressed by the fuzzy rules). Rules in the FSOM may be generated through theoretical knowledge (provided by experts) or empirically using the dynamic learning algorithm.
Constrained static learning algorithm
The two phases of the static learning algorithm have been constrained to enable changes in the approximated function without leading to faulty parameter states. As illustrated in Fig. 14 , the extension to the learning algorithm makes provision for post-conditions that are placed upon each desired parameter change. The updating laws remain unchanged since they define the desired parameter adaptations for performance. Post-conditions 'verify' whether the adaptation will lead to a failure mode i.e. they check for conformity to the safety constraints. If the desired adaptation (determined by the learning laws) conforms to the safety constraints, then the adaptation is accepted, otherwise, the adaptation is rejected. For cases when the desired adaptation is rejected, the training sample can be logged and used again later in the training process (after some arbitrary number of epochs). Since the output learning rates decay during the learning process, their values (once reduced) will allow minor changes to the parameter state. Therefore, reusing 'rejected' samples later in the learning process may be more acceptable than early in the process where large changes occur. Furthermore, if the sample infers a highly unsafe representation (i.e. due to noise), a 'smaller' learning rate increases the possibility of parameter adaptation acceptance (since the influence of the sample has been reduced to a lesser degree). Attempting to reprocess 'rejected' training samples is advantageous, particularly if the number of available samples is small.
A summary of the constrained static learning algorithm illustrated in Fig. 14 is as follows:
Step 1: The SCANN parameter state is acquired by the learning algorithm.
Step 2: Learning laws such as (45) are used to determine the desired adaptation. Post-conditions relating to the ARTICLE IN PRESS safety constraints are then checked as part of the 'verification' process.
Step 3: If the adaptation does not conform to the postconditions then the training sample pair is rejected and logged.
Step 4: The 'verified' adaptation is approved and applied to the SCANN parameter state.
An overview of the constrained static learning algorithm for on-line updating is as follows:
Begin Constrained Static Learning Algorithm 1. Let p(t) be the SCANN parameter state 2. Feed in training sample pair (desired input and output) 3. Perform centre, spread or output tuning using learning laws [9] on tp(t)-a temporary copy of the SCANN parameter state which when tuned does not affect actual SCANN behaviour 4. Identify the presence of any safety constraint violations or faults in tp(t) (post-condition 'verification') A Determine the set of rules R affected by desired parameter adaptation B Acquire defined safety constraints for rules in R C Determine conformity ('verification') of desired adaptation with the safety constraints D If there is no violation of any safety constraint then use tp(t) as the new SCANN state E Otherwise, reject tp(t) and preserve training sample (reuse when learning rate has been further decayed)
End Constrained Static Learning Algorithm
The constrained static learning algorithm checks the desired SCANN parameter state for potential violations of all assigned safety constraints (Step 4D). In some cases, if input parameters are being tuned, then not all constraints placed upon rule consequents need to be checked. However, this is an issue related to the efficiency of the checking algorithm and is not important for preventing faults that lead to the failure modes.
One major benefit of using constrained algorithms is that alternative learning laws can be employed without impacting the safety of the behaviour (incorporating additional systematic faults). The motivation for substituting learning laws (in Step 3) is principally for improving performance for specific operating contexts. Potential performance improvements may include more efficient convergence and accurate learning (minimising RMSE). The mechanisms that permit this capability are the post-condition items 'A'-'E' in the constrained algorithm.
A major benefit of the constrained learning algorithm is its ability to be resistant to overly large learning rates. As described in [5] the choice of the learning rates determines how fast the algorithm convergences onto to the desired function. Suitable values for the learning rate can be calculated by examining the input and output universe of discourse [5] . However, if learning rates (for consequent tuning performed by LMS) are too high, then the parameter weights converge onto infinity (or the error converges onto infinity). The constrained learning algorithm provides means to prevent such conditions from occurring. If overly large learning rates are used, then the algorithm post-condition will detect violations very early during training. For such cases, the weights will be left unaltered. This means that the parameters become 'frozen' until suitable learning rates are used and also applies to all parameters associated with the rule consequents (since constraints to mitigate all failure modes are influenced by all the output parameters).
Maximising the 'fidelity' of training data is a common task for training of ANNs. Training data may be composed of 'noisy' or flawed input-output pairs caused by sensor inaccuracies or by other sources. Data may also consist of samples which infer a hazardous function (one that leads to failure modes). The advantage of using the safety constraints is that training data of arbitrary integrity can be used without impact to safety. Since adaptations that lead to constraint violations are 'rejected', the SCANN behaviour prevents adaptation to input-output mappings that cause hazardous failures (preventing systematic faults). The 'quality' of the training data only impacts the performance of the SCANN behaviour. Practical examples of safety constraints engaged during learning and their impact are presented in [21] .
Dynamic learning algorithm
The self-generation of fuzzy rules is an attractive property as it automatically acquires novel features described by training data. Adding more rules contribute to the function approximation ability of the FSOM. The topology and architecture is automatically adapted (creating new neurons and links) without user intervention. The self-generation method described in [7] uses three heuristic rules to create new fuzzy rules which are:
Errors are removed in descending order
This 'guarantees' that fuzzy rules are added so that the largest error (between FSOM and training sample outputs) is removed first. This error is determined during each training cycle or epoch. 2. New fuzzy rule is only added once existing fuzzy rules have been tuned
If the FSOM has difficulty reducing error (using static learning), a new rule is added at the input sample point with default spread.
Interference caused by new rule upon existing rules is minimised
To prevent 'forgetting' of previously learnt knowledge the width of new rule spread is limited.
This process is used during the development lifecycle for ANNs [3] prior to certification. The earliest time which this process can stop is determined by criteria used by Preliminary System Safety Assessment and an additional phase of safety assessment [3] . This includes providing assurance that the input space is covered and rules overlap (described in Section 3). Further details on dynamic learning can be found in [9] .
Constrained dynamic learning algorithm
Safety constraints can be exploited to permit self-generation without the need for re-certification. One advantage of this capability enables the SCANN to learn large changes (or new features) inferred by the training data. This task may be computationally inefficient by solely relying upon parameter adaptation (static learning). The approach of the constrained dynamic learning algorithm is to constrain new rules in order to guarantee that existing safety constraints are not violated (through the introduction of faults).
Constrained dynamic learning can be best used for applications where only failure modes 1 to 4 are of concern, for both SISO and MISO type rules. This limitation is a result of new rules typically violating constraints such as (27) (rule overlap restrictions) and (28) (preventing subsets).
To provide assurance that failure modes 1 and 2 are not violated, the new rule 'inherits' safety constraints from rules that overlap with the new rule. All premise and consequent parameters are chosen to abide by the semantic and coverage safety constraints.
Suppose that a new rule d has been self-generated and requires insertion into the rule base. This new rule will consist of fuzzy sets whose spreads are defined using the parameters of the self-generating algorithm. Once the output bounds have been derived, the spreads of the new rule can also be inherited. Since the output bounds are a subset of all existing rule output bounds, the valid preconditions can be defined as (50)-(52). In this way, constraints of the new rule follow the semantic constraints that have been defined for the existing rules. An example of semantic constraint inheritance is illustrated in Fig. 15 . Failure modes 3 and 4 are not of major concern when adding new rules. For SISO systems, coverage is guaranteed prior to certification and the addition of further rules does not violate any of the coverage constraints. Furthermore, when adding a new rule for MISO systems, the antecedent does not have to be combined with others for the same reason as for SISO rules. This is because the multi-dimensional input space coverage is already captured by the existing rules. To prevent failure mode 4, the spread of the new rule always lies within the defined input variable extremes [min x j , max x j ] according to (21) (safety constraint), (50) and (51) (for new rule spreads).
The algorithm for constrained self-generation (dynamic learning) is described as follows and illustrated in Fig. 16 .
Step 3 of the algorithm refers to constraints placed upon the upper rule limit (to fulfil non-functional spatial and temporal requirements). 
Begin Constrained Dynamic Learning

End Constrained Dynamic Learning Algorithm
Finally, to allow the constrained dynamic learning algorithm to be used post-certification, Step 5d performs a final check (of the knowledge base with the added rule) for systematic faults. If faults are revealed then the new rule is rejected. This step is useful for enabling dynamic learning post-certification for failure modes 5-8. Since the dynamic learning algorithm will typically not add new rules (because of safety constraint violations) there are two reasons for allowing the process to compute new rules:
1. The algorithm is able to find new rules which can be logged and incorporated through SCANN development and safety processes [21] . 2. Alternative self-generation algorithms can be used if
Step 5 is preserved.
By retaining the SCANN self-generation algorithm (for failure modes 5-8), a better understanding can be provided about the problem through the desired rules. In addition to static learning, the dynamic learning algorithm is nevertheless exploited to enable the SCANN knowledge to evolve by interacting with the environment.
New algorithms can define alternative means to discover new rules and adjust the SCANN knowledge base. This is to increase the chances of adding a new rule without incorporated faults. To achieve this, Steps 1-4 can be replaced however, Step 5 must be preserved. Additional safety arguments would not be obligatory concerning the prevention of faults during the new steps if Step 5d is incorporated within the algorithm before a new rule is added.
Benefits of SCANN application
As described in Section 2, the FSOM has been successfully employed in a wide range of control domain applications. The SCANN can be used for both industrial control applications (where inputs are sensors and outputs are actuators) and medical systems (where inputs are sensors and output is dosage [22] ). By exploiting safety constraints, the SCANN approach may be more beneficial than safety 'monitors'. For example, the underlying behaviour can be extracted and understood along with attempted constraint violations during learning. Moreover, implementing local constraints (for each rule) can result in overly complex safety monitors.
The SCANN can approximate 'safe' functions using dynamic learning as long as safety constraints are not violated. A real-world application of the SCANN within the Gas Turbine Aero-Engine is presented in [23] . Efficiency benefits associated with the use of SCANN technology are listed below:
Performance: Generalisation and learning abilities can be exploited to approximate a desired function without the need for re-certification as illustrated in Fig. 17(a) and (b).
Adaptation: Performance can be maximised by adapting to a changing operating context. For example, in aeroengine control the static learning algorithm can adapt to maximise thrust in the presence of aero-engine degradation [23, 24] .
Design: During development of the SCANN, the learning algorithms have the ability to directly interact with the problem domain and 'self-generate'. By coupling this derived knowledge with prior knowledge (defined by experts) the specification can be derived from both empirical and theoretical sources.
Maintenance:
The SCANN has the ability to detect when the operating context is approaching hazardous conditions. For example, consider Fig. 17(c) where the SCANN function (inferred by the output parameters) is outside the bounds for rules 2 and 3 but constrained by layer 6. This condition may arise due to unrepresentative training data or changes in the operating context (such as engine wear). Attempted bound violations can be logged and used for system health monitoring. This knowledge can be exploited to indicate the need for product maintenance. 
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Conclusions
In this paper the definition of the SCANN has been presented. This stems from the notion of the 'hybrid' ANN and the Fuzzy Self-Organising Map in particular. The SCANN model exhibits highly desirable and profitable characteristics related to the transparency it offers in its representation of behaviour. Fuzzy rules are translated into the SCANN (through rule 'insertion') without compromise to their fidelity. This can be achieved since the knowledge is represented in highly structured forms using neurons, links and parameters. Furthermore, the highly organised representation of behaviour within the SCANN enables computationally efficient rule extraction.
SCANN has also been defined to perform non-linear function approximation which is useful for control problems. Failure modes associated with functional properties were systematically identified using HAZOP guide words (for non-linear function approximation). This approach ensured that a wide range of potential hazardous failures for specific applications are discovered.
The meaningful white-box view of the SCANN attained by exploiting fuzzy rules enables human understandable representations. By exploiting the transparent nature of the SCANN, parameters are constrained using a range of safety constraints to mitigate identified failure modes. Semantic constraints are defined to bound rule preconditions and post-condition. These constraints are potentially unique over each rule. Coverage constraints have also been derived to ensure coverage of the desired input-output mappings. Output change constraints have also been considered which constrain or bound the SCANN function derivative. Finally, safety mechanisms have also been defined which are used to compose the SCANN architecture.
Safety constraints enable both learning and generalisation capabilities post-certification. Constrained static and dynamic learning have been presented that ensure safe adaptation without incorporating systematic faults that lead to identified failure modes. These algorithms allow both parameter adaptation and self-generation without the need for re-certification and make provision for training data of arbitrary integrity. These SCANN qualities offer potential efficiency gains over conventional schemes [24] and is a valuable tool for safety critical applications.
This approach enables credible analytical certification arguments required for operation in high criticality roles in safety critical systems.
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